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Abstract. Through their global, uniform provision of services and their dis­
tributed nature, global computers have the potential to profoundly enhance our 
daily life. However, they will not realize their full potential, unless the necessary 
levels of trust and security can be guaranteed.
The goal of the MOBIUS project is to develop a Proof Carrying Code architecture 
to secure global computers that consist of Java-enabled mobile devices. In this 
progress report, we detail its objectives and provide a snapshot of the project 
results during its first year of activity.
1 Introduction
Global computers are distributed computational infrastructures that aim at providing 
services globally and uniformly; examples include the Internet, banking networks, tele­
phone networks, digital video infrastructures, peer-to-peer and ad hoc networks, virtual 
private networks, home area networks, and personal area networks. While global com­
puters may deeply affect our quality of life, security is paramount for them to become 
pervasive infrastructures in our society, as envisioned in ambient intelligence. Indeed, 
numerous application domains, including e-government and e-health, involve sensitive 
data that must be protected from unauthorized parties. Malicious attackers spreading 
over the network and widely disconnecting or disrupting devices could have devastat­
ing economic and social consequences and would deeply affect end-users’ confidence 
in e-society. In spite of clear risks, provisions to enforce security in global computers 
remain extremely primitive. Some global computers, for instance in the automotive in­
dustry, choose to enforce security by maintaining devices completely under the control 
of the operator. Other models, building on the Java security architecture, choose to en­
force security via a sandbox model that distinguishes between a fixed trusted computing
* Work partially supported by the Integrated Project MOBIUS, within the Global Computing II 
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base and untrusted applications. Unfortunately, these approaches are too restrictive to 
be serious options for the design of secure global computers. In fact, any security ar­
chitecture for global computing must meet requirements that reach beyond the limits of 
currently deployed models.
The objective of the MOBIUS project is to develop the technology for establish­
ing trust and security in global computers, using the Proof Carrying Code (PCC) 
paradigm [37,36]. The essential features of the MOBIUS security architecture are:
-  innovative trust management, dispensing with centralized trust entities, and allow­
ing individual components to gain trust by providing verifiable certificates of their 
innocuousness; and
-  static enforcement mechanisms, sufficiently flexible to cover the wide range of 
security concerns arising in global computing, and sufficiently resource-aware and 
confígurable to be applicable to the wide range of devices in global computers; and
-  support for system component downloading, for compatibility with the view of 
a global computer as an evolving network of autonomous, heterogeneous and 
extensible devices.
MOBIUS targets are embedded execution frameworks that can run third party applica­
tions which must be checked against a platform security policy. In order to maximize 
its chances of success, the MOBIUS project focuses on global computers that consist 
of Java-enabled devices, and in particular on devices that support the Mobile Informa­
tion Device Profile (MIDP, version 2) of the Connected Limited Device Configuration 
(CLDC) of the Java 2 Micro Edition.
2 MIDP
CLDC is a variant of Java for the embedded industry, and stands between JavaCard 
and Java Standard Edition. CLDC is a perfect setting for MOBIUS because it has all 
the characteristics of a real language: true memory management, object orientation, 
etc., but applications developed for it are still closed: there is no reflection API, no C 
interface (JNI) and no dynamic class loading (class loading is done at launch time). 
Furthermore, CLDC is widely accepted by the industry as a runtime environment for 
downloadable code: on mobile phones (MIDP), set-top-boxes (JSR 242) and smart card 
terminal equipment (STIP).
The MIDP profile is a set of libraries for the CLDC platform that provides a 
standardized environment for Java applications on mobile phones (so-called midlets). Its 
wide deployment (1.2 billion handsets) has lead to a consensus on security objectives. 
Moreover, MIDP promotes the idea of small generic mobile devices downloading 
services from the network and is an archetypal example of the global computing 
paradigm.
MIDP defines a simple connection framework for establishing communications over 
various technologies, with a single method to open a connection that takes as argument 
a URL which encodes the protocol, the target address, and some of the connection 
parameters. MIDP offers a graphical user interface implementing the view/controller
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paradigm and provides access to specific mobile phones resources (persistent store, 
players, camera, geolocalisation, etc.)
MIDP security policy is based on the approval by the end-user of every method 
call that can threaten the security of the user (such as opening a network connection). 
Depending on the API, the frequency of security screens varies (from once for all to 
once for every call).
This scheme, although simple, has several drawbacks: users accept dangerous calls 
one at a time and have no idea of the forthcoming calls necessary for the transaction; 
there can be too many screens to perform a simple transaction; moreover even a clearly 
malicious action will be statistically accepted by some users if the customer basis is large 
enough. To mitigate some of these risks, MIDP2.0 proposes to sign midlets. Signing 
changes the level of trust of the midlet and reduces the number of mandatory warning 
screens. Signing moves the decision of accepting an API call from the end-user to a 
trusted entity (the manufacturer, the operator or an entity endorsed by them), but it does 
not provide clues to take the decision. One goal of MOBIUS is to develop the necessary 
technology for allowing the developer to supply clues and proofs that can help operators 
to validate midlets developed by third parties.
Finally, MIDP dynamic security policy does not provide any control on the informa­
tion flow. This is in contrast with the european legislation that puts information control 
at the heart of its requirements for computerized systems [38]. The information flow 
analysis reported in Section 5.3 provides a first step to provide a technical enforcement 
of those regulations.
Several factors such as handset bugs, different handset capabilities, operational en­
vironment (language, network), etc. lead to a fragmentation of MIDP implementations. 
As resources (cpu, memory for heap, code or persistent data) on device are scarce, code 
specialization is the only viable alternative to adapt application to handsets. It is not 
uncommon to have hundreds of versions of a single application. Whereas some solu­
tions exist for automating the development, the management, and the provisioning to the 
handset of so many variants, in practice, validation [32] is still based on a technology 
which is unable to cope with multiple versions: black-box testing. Indeed, only the byte­
code is available to test houses, as software companies refuse to disclose their source 
code to third parties to protect their intellectual property. MOBIUS outcome should help 
to automate the validation process for operators. PCC can be used on the most complex 
properties whereas type based techniques could be sufficient on simple ones.
3 PCC Scenarios
Figure 1 shows the basic structure of all certificate-based mobile code security models, 
including Proof Carrying Code. This basic model, or scenario, comprises a code 
producer and a code consumer. The basic idea in PCC is that the code is accompanied 
by a certifícate. The certificate can be automatically and efficiently checked by the 
consumer and it provides verifiable evidence that the code abides by a given security 
policy. The main difference w.r.t. digital signatures is that the latter allows having 
certainty on the origin of the code, whereas PCC allows having certainty about the 
behaviour of the code. Different flavours of PCC exist which use different techniques
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Fig. 1. Certificate-based Mobile Code Security
for generating certificates, ranging from traditional logic-based verification to static 
analysis in general and type systems in particular.
In the context of global computing, this initial scenario needs to be extended in a 
number of ways to consider the presence of multiple producers, multiple consumers, 
multiple verifiers and intermediaries. We have identified a series of innovative scenarios 
for applying Proof Carrying Code in the context of global computers [23]; below we 
summarize the main scenarios and issues of interest within the context of MOBIUS.
3.1 Wholesale PCC for MIDP devices
Figure 2 depicts the MOBIUS scenario for MIDP devices. It involves a trusted inter­
mediary (typically the mobile phone operator), code producers that are external to the 
phone companies, and code consumers (the end users). PCC is used by developers to 
supply phone operators with proofs which establish that the application is secure. The 
operator then digitally signs the code before distributing it to the user.
This scenario for “wholesale” verification by a code distributor effectively combines 
the best of both PCC and trust, and brings important benefits to all participating actors. 
For the end user in particular, the scenario does not add PCC infrastructure complexity 
to the device, but still allows effective enforcement of advanced security policies.
From the point of view of phone operators, the proposed scenario enables achieving 
the required level of confidence in MIDP applications developed by third parties through 
formal verification. Although this process is very costly, which often results in third 
party code not being distributed, PCC enables operators to reproduce the program 
verification process performed by producers, but completely automatically and at a small 
fraction of the cost.
From the software producer perspective, the scenario removes the bottleneck of the 
manual approval/rejection of code by the operator. This results in a significant increase 
in market opportunity. Of course, this comes at a cost: producers have to verify their 
code and generate a certificate before shipping it to the operator, in return for access 
to a market with a large potential and which has remained rather closed to independent 
software companies.
3.2 Retail PCC and on-device checking
Although our main MOBIUS scenario is for wholesale proof-checking by a trusted 
intermediary, we are also exploring possibilities for “retail” PCC where checking
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Fig. 2. The MOBIUS scenario
takes place on the device itself. Limited computing capabilities rule out full-blown 
proof-checking for the moment, but there are other kinds of certificates that support 
verification: MIDP already annotates code with basic type information for lightweight 
bytecode verification [40], and we aim to extend this with more sophisticated types 
to capture security properties, and with the results of other analyses as in abstraction- 
carrying code [1]. Complementary to digital signatures, these certificates maintain the 
PCC property that clients perform actual verification ofreceived code, by providing rich 
type information to make it fast and cheap to do.
3.3 Beyond the MOBIUS scenarios
Though the MOBIUS scenario concerns networks of mobile devices, we believe that 
the concept of trusted intermediary and the use of off-device PCC can have a significant 
impact in the quality of the applications developed in other contexts. For the case of 
general-purpose computers, we believe that our scenario is also applicable, since the 
role of trusted intermediary can be played by other organizations such as end-user 
organizations, governmental institutions, non-profit organizations, private companies, 
etc. Note that this scenario is radically different from the situation today: though some 
organizations play the role of trusted intermediaries, they do not have the technology 
for formally verifying code and they have to resort to other techniques such as manual 
code inspection. Thus, we argue that PCC holds the promise of bringing the benefits of 
software verification to everyone. The fact that verified code becomes available at low 
cost will increase the demand on verified code, which will in turn encourage software 
companies to produce verified code with certificates.
4 Security requirements
A fundamental question in developing a security architecture for global computers is the 
inventory of the security requirements that we should be able to express and guarantee. 
This has been the one of the first step of the project.
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The choice to focus on the MIDP framework was very helpful, as it allowed us 
to consider concrete examples of various kinds of security requirements. Moreover, as 
the framework has been actively used for some time, there is considerable experience 
with security requirements for MIDP applications. Although inspired by concrete MIDP 
setting, or even concrete MIDP ahpplications, the range of security requirements we 
have found is representative of the requirements that are important for any distributed 
computing infrastructure.
We have considered two, largely orthogonal ways to analyse and classify security 
requirements. In a first deliverable [19], we investigated two important classes of 
security requirements, namely resource usage and information flow. In a second one 
[20] we considered general security requirements that apply to all applications for 
the MIDP framework, so-called framework-speciflc security requirements, and security 
requirements specific to a given application, so-called application-specific security 
requirements. Here we summarise the main conclusions of those reports.
4.1 Resources
Any global computing infrastructure naturally raises issues about identifying and 
managing the resources required by mobile code. This is especially true on small 
devices, where resources are limited.
Central issues for resource policies are: what resources they should describe; 
how resource policies can contribute to security; and what kinds of formalism are 
appropriate. Surveying different possible kinds of “resource”, we are looking to identify 
those that are both likely to be amenable to formal analysis by current technologies, and 
are also clearly useful to real-world MIDP applications. Some of these are classical 
instances of computational resources, namely time, where counting bytecodes executed 
can be a useful estimate of actual runtime, and space, of stack or heap, which may be 
rather limited on a mobile device. The focus on MIDP also allows us to address some 
platform-specific kinds of resource, namely persistent store, as file storage space will 
be limited, and billable events such as text messages (SMS) or network connections 
(HTTP), which have real-money costs for the user. Many of these platform-specific 
resources can be unified by treating particular system calls as the resource to be 
managed: how many times they are invoked, and with what arguments. This fits neatly 
into the existing MIDP security model, where certain APIs are only available to trusted 
applications.
Policies to control resources such as these are useful in themselves, but they 
also have a particular impact on security. First, some platform-specific resources are 
intrinsically valuable — for example, because an operator will charge money for them
— and so we want to guard against their loss. Further, overuse of limited resources on the 
device itself may compromise availability, leading to denial of service vulnerabilities.
4.2 Information flow
Information policies can track integrity or confidentiality. We concentrated on the 
second, as the former is essentially just its dual. The attacker model is a developer 
who leaks sensitive information to untrusted parties, either intentionally (in case of
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a malicious developer) or by accident. On the MIDP platform sensitive information 
is typically information related to the user: sources include the addressbook, audio 
or video capture, the permanent store, and textfields where the user typed in private 
data. Untrusted information sinks are network connections and the permanent store, 
especially if the store is shared between applications.
4.3 Framework-specific security requirements
Framework-specific security requirements describe generic requirements applicable 
to all the applications running on a given framework. In industry there is already 
considerable experience with framework-specific security requirements for MIDP. [20] 
provides a comprehensive listing of all of these requirements.
Many of these requirements concern critical API methods: both the use of certain 
methods (does the application uses the network ?) and possibly also the arguments 
supplied to them (for example the URL supplied to open a connection defines the 
protocol used). Deciding these questions is already an issue in the current MIDP code­
signing scheme: to decide if signing is safe, it is necessary to know statically which 
critical APIs are used and to compute an approximation of the possible values of their 
key parameters. There are already some dedicated static analysis techniques for this [16, 
24], but there is a limit to what such automated analyses can achieve.
More complicated requirements on API methods are temporal properties that involve 
the sequencing of actions, such as a requirement that every file that is opened must be 
closed before the program exits. Checking these properties requires a deeper insight 
of the control flow of a program, which can be complicated by the possibility of 
runtime exceptions, the dependency on dynamic data structures, and the influence of 
thread synchronization. Finite state automata are a convenient formalism for specifying 
temporal requirements. Such automata can be expressed in the program specification 
language JML that we plan to use. Moreover, they are easily understandable by non­
experts.9
4.4 Application-specific security requirements
An individual application may have specific security requirements beyond the generic 
requirements that apply to all the applications. These application-specific security re­
quirements may simply be more specific instances of framework-specific security prop­
erties, but can also be radically different. Whereas framework-specific requirements are 
often about the absence of unwanted behaviour, security requirements for a particular 
application may include functional requirements, concerning the correctness of some 
functional behaviour. Application-specific properties are usually more complex than 
framework-specific properties and less likely to be certified by fully automatic tech­
niques.
We have selected some archetypical applications representative of classical applica­
tion domains for which interesting security requirements can be expressed. These ap­
plications include a secure private storage provider, an instant messenger client, an SSH
9 In fact, the current industrial standard for testing MIDP applications, the Unified Testing 
Criteria [32] already uses finite automata for specification, albeit informally.
8 Barthe et al.
client, and an application for remote electronic voting. All of these have strong security 
requirements, including information flow requirements, that go beyond the framework- 
specific requirements.
The final two applications selected are in fact core services of the MIDP platform 
itself rather than applications that run on the platform, namely a bytecode verifier and 
a modified access controller. Note that for these components functional correctness is 
one of the security requirements. The specification language JML that we will use in 
logic-based verification is capable of expressing such functional requirements, although 
extensions to conveniently use mathematical structures in specification, as proposed in 
[15], may be needed to make this practical.
5 Enabling technologies
A central component of the technology being developed by MOBIUS is a hierarchy 
of mechanisms that allow one to reason about intensional and extensional properties 
of MIDP-compliant programs executed on a Java Virtual Machine. The two enabling 
technologies that these mechanisms rely on are typing and logic-based verification. 
Depending on the security property, and the respective computational resources, code 
producer and consumer (or verifier in the case of wholesale PCC) may negotiate about 
the level at which the certificate is formulated. For example, the availability of a type 
system with an automated inference algorithm reduces the amount of code annotations, 
whereas expressive program logics may be applied in cases when type systems are 
insufficiently flexible, or when no static analysis is known that ensures the property of 
interest. In the sequel, we provide a short overview of the mechanisms developed during 
the first year of the project, namely the MOBIUS program logic for sequential bytecode, 
and type systems for resources, information flow, and aliasing.
In the following sections we summarise some of the formal systems which we have 
developed and outline possible verification approaches.
5.1 Operational model
The lowest level of our hierarchy of formal systems consists of an operational model of 
the Java Virtual Machine that is appropriate for MOBIUS. In particular, as a consequence 
of the choice to target the MIDP prifile of the CLDC platform, features such as reflection 
and dynamic class loading may safely be ignored, as is the case for complex data types. 
In addition, our current model is restricted to the sequential fragment of the JVM and 
does not model garbage collection.
The operational model builds the basis for all program verification formalisms to be 
developed in MOBIUS : all formal systems considered within the MOBIUS project -  and 
hence the validity of certificates -  may in principle be given interpretations that only 
refer to the operational judgments defining the model. Like any mathematical proof, 
these interpretations may involve some abstractions and definitional layers, including 
some more abstract operational semantics which we have defined and formally proven 
compatible with the small-step relation.
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In order to guarantee the utmost adherence to the official specification, we have 
implemented a small step semantics. The corresponding judgement relates two consec­
utive states during program execution. We keep the same level of detail as the official 
description, but with some simplifications due to the fact that we concentrate on the 
CLDC platform.
The correctness of an operational model can not be formally proved, we assert it 
axiomatically, and have developed a rigorous mathematical description of it, called 
Bicolano, in the Coq proof assistant [43]. In order to get more confidence in our 
axiomatization we have also developed an executable version of fragments of Bicolano 
which can be used to compare evaluation results with other implementations of the 
official specification.
5.2 Program logic
The second layer of our reasoning infrastructure is built by a program logic. This allows 
proof patterns typically arising during the verification of recursive program structures 
to be treated in a uniform matter. Extending program logics with partial-correctness 
interpretations, the MOBIUS logic supports the verification of non-terminating program 
executions by incorporating strong invariants [28].
The global specification structure is given by a table M that associates a partial­
correctness method specification ^  and a method invariant p  to each defined method, 
where the latter relates each state occurring throughout the (finite or infinite) execution 
of the method to its initial state. In order to support the modular verification of virtual 
methods, the method specification table is required to satisfy a behavioural subtyping 
condition which mandates that the specification of an overriding method declaration 
must be stronger (i.e. imply) the specification of the overwritten method. In addition, 
each program point in a method may be decorated with an assertion that is to be 
satisfied whenever the control flow passes through the decorated program point. All 
such annotations are collected in a global annotation table Q.
The program logic employs proof judgements of the form G h {A} I  { B }  (I  ) where 
the program point I  (comprising a method identifier M  and a label in the definition of 
M  's body) is associated with a (local) precondition A, a local postcondition B , a (strong) 
invariant I . The types and intended meanings of these components are as follows.
Whenever the execution of M , starting at label 0 and initial state so reaches I
with current state s, and A (s0, s) holds, then
-  B (s0, s, t) holds, provided that the method terminates with final state t,
-  I (s0, s , H ) holds, provided that H  is the heap component of any state 
arising during the continuation of the current method invocation, including 
invocations of further methods, i.e. subframes,
-  Q(s0, s') holds, provided that s' is reached at some label (! during the con­
tinuation of the current method invocation, but not including subframes, 
where Q(i') = Q.
Moreover, the judgements are supplied with a proof context G . The latter contains 
assumptions typically associated with merge-points in the control flow graph. These
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assumptions are used by the logic rules in order to avoid infinite cycling in the proof 
derivation. For the technical details of this the reader is referred to [22,9].
In order to give a flavor of what the proof rules look like, we show the rule for basic 
instructions (arithmetic operations, load/store,... ):
G h [PreM,i(A)} M, s u c m (0 { P o s ì m , i ( B ) }  (Invm , i  (I)) 0  
G h {A} M , l  { B }  ( I )
Note that the correctness of l depends on the correctness of its successor. Also, the 
rule uses predicate transformers PreM,l (A) ,PostM,l (A), and In vM, i ( I ) which relate 
the assertions for the successor instruction with the assertions of instruction l . For the 
definition of these transformers, see [9]. Finally, the side condition 0  states that the local 
precondition A implies the strong invariant I  and any annotation that may be associated 
with M, l in the annotation table Q:
0  =  V s0  s. A (s 0 , s) ^  ( I  (s 0 , s, heap (s)) A V Q. Q(M, l) =  Q ^  Q ( s 0 , s)).
In addition to rules of similar shape for all instruction forms, the logic is also supplied 
with logical rules, such as a consequence rule and an axiom rule that extracts assump­
tions from the proof context.
We have proven a soundness theorem for the proof system which ensures that the 
derivability of a judgement G h {A} I  {B} (I  ) entails its semantic validity. The latter 
is obtained by formulating the above informal interpretation in terms of Bicolano's 
operational judgements.
This soundness result may subsequently be extended to programs. We first say that 
a program has been verified if each entry in the method specification table is justified 
by a derivation for the corresponding method body, and similarly for the entries of 
local proof contexts G. The soundness result for programs then asserts that all methods 
of a verified program satisfy their specifications: whenever M (M ) =  (&, p) holds, 
any invocation of M  is guaranteed to fulfill the method invariant p, with terminating 
invocations additionally satisfying the partial-correctness assertion ^.
In order to evaluate our logic experimentally, we have implemented a verification 
condition generator (VCgen) that applies proof rules in an automatic fashion and emits 
verifications conditions stemming from side conditions such as 0  above, and from the 
application of the rule of consequence.
In the next period of the project, we will extend the logic by mechanisms for 
reasoning about the consumption of resources and incorporate ghost variables and 
associated concepts. This will provide a platform for the encoding of some type systems 
that defy the current version of the program logic. A typical example are type systems 
that track the number of calls to certain API-methods like sending of SMS messages or 
opening files.
5.3 Type systems
In this section we describe MOBIUS work on types for information flow, resources, 
and alias control. Classically, types in programming languages are used to check data 
formats, but we envisage much broader type-based verification, with specialised systems
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to analyse individual security properties. Indeed, Java 5 has annotations that support just 
such pluggable type systems [11].
Information flow Work on information flow has focused on the definition of an 
accurate information flow type system for sequential Java bytecode and on its relation 
with information flow typing for Java source code, as well as on flexible analyses for 
concurrency.
Policies Our work mainly focuses on termination insensitive policies which assume 
that the attacker can only draw observations on the input/output behavior of methods. 
Formally, the observational power of the attacker is captured by its security level (taken 
from a lattice S of security levels) and by indistinguishability relations ~  on the semantic 
domains of the JVM memory, including the heap and the output value of methods 
(normal values or exceptional values).
Then, policies are expressed as a combination of global policies, that attach levels 
to fields, and local policies, that attach to methods identifiers signatures of the form 
khk v — ► k r , where k v sets the security level of local variables, kh is the heap effect of the 
method, and kr  is a record of security levels of the form {n : kn , e1 : k e i , . . .  en : k en }, 
where kn is the security level of the return value (normal termination) and each e¿ is an 
exception class that might be propagated by the method, and kei is its corresponding 
security level.
khA method is safe w.r.t. a signature k v — ► kr if:
1. two terminating runs of the method with -equivalent inputs and equivalent 
heaps, yield ~ kr -equivalent results and equivalent heaps;
2. the heap effect of the method is greater than kh, i.e. the method does not perform 
field updates on fields whose security level is below k h.
The definition of heap equivalence adopted in existing works on information flow for 
heap-based language, including [8], often assumes that pointers are opaque, i.e. the 
only observations that an attacker can make about a reference are those about the object 
to which it points. However, Hedin and Sands [29] have recently observed that the 
assumption is unvalidated by methods from the Java API, and exhibited a Jif program 
that does not use declassification but leaks information through invoking API methods. 
Their attack relies on the assumption that the function that allocates new objects on the 
heap is deterministic; however, this assumption is perfectly reasonable and satisfied by 
many implementations of the JVM. In addition to demonstrating the attack, Hedin and 
Sands show how a refined information flow type system can thwart such attacks for a 
language that allows to cast references as integers. Intuitively, their type system tracks 
the security level of references as well as the security levels of the fields of the object 
its points to.
Bytecode verification for secure information flow  We have defined a lightweight 
bytecode verifier that enforces non-interference of JVM applications, and proved 
formally its soundness against Bicolano [8]. The lightweight bytecode verifier performs
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a one-pass analysis of programs, and checks for every program point that the instruction 
verifies the constraints imposed by transition rules of the form
P[i] =  in s  con stra in ts  (ins, st, s t ' , r ) 
r , i  h s t ^  s t'
where i is an index consisting of a method body and a program point for this body, 
and the environment r  contains policies, a table of security signatures for each method 
identifier, a security environment that maps program points to security levels, as well 
as information about the branching structure of programs, that is verified independently 
in a preliminary analysis. For increased precision, the preliminary analysis checks null 
pointers (to predict unthrowable null pointer exceptions), classes (to predict target of 
throw instructions), array accesses (to predict unthrowable out-of-bounds exceptions), 
and exceptions (to over-approximate the set of throwable exceptions for each method); 
the information is then used by a CDR checker that verifies control dependence regions 
(cdr), using the results of the PA analyser to minimise the size of regions.
Relation with information flow type system for Java JFlow [34] is an information flow 
aware extension of Java that enforces statically flexible and expressive information 
policies by a constraint-based algorithm. Although the expressiveness of JFlow makes 
it difficult to characterize the security properties enforced by its type system, sound 
information flow type systems inspired from JFlow have been proposed for exception- 
free fragments of Java.
JFlow offers a practical tool for developing secure applications but does not address 
mobile code security as envisioned in MOBIUS since it applies to source code. In order 
to show that applications written in (a variant of) JFlow can be deployed in a mobile code 
architecture that delivers the promises of JFlow in terms of confidentiality, [7] proves 
that a standard (non-optimizing) Java compiler translates programs that are typable in a 
type system inspired from [5], but extended to exceptions, into programs that are typable 
in our system.
Concurrency Extending the results of [8] to multi-threaded JVM programs is necessary 
in order to cover MIDP applications, but notoriously difficult to achieve. Motivated 
by the desire to provide flexible and practical enforcement mechanisms for concurrent 
languages, Russo and Sabelfeld [41] develop a sound information flow type system that 
enforces termination-insensitive non-interference in for a simple concurrent imperative 
language. The originality of their approach resides in the use of pseudo-commands to 
constrain the behavior of the scheduler so as to avoid internal timing leaks. One objective 
of the project is to extend their ideas to the setting of the JVM.
Declassification Information flow type systems have not found substantial applications 
in practice, in particular because information flow policies based on non-interference 
are too rigid and do not authorize information release. In contrast, many applications 
often release deliberately some amount of sensitive information. Typical examples of 
deliberate information release include sending an encrypted message through an un­
trusted network, or allowing confidential information to be used in statistics over large
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databases. In a recent survey [42], A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands provide an overview of 
relaxed policies that allow for some amount of information release, and a classification 
along several dimensions, for example who releases the information, and what informa­
tion is released. Type-based enforcement mechanisms for declassification are presented 
in [12].
Resource analysis In §4.1 we identified requirements for MOBIUS resource security 
policies, as well as some notions of “resource” relevant to the MIDP application domain. 
Here we survey work within the project on analyses to support such policies, with 
particular focus on the possibility of formally verifying their correctness: essential if 
they are to be a basis for proof-carrying code.
Memory usage The Java platform has a mandatory memory allocation model: a stack 
for local variables, and an object heap. In [9] we introduce a bytecode type system 
for this, where each program point has a type giving an upper limit on the number of 
heap objects it allocates. Correctness is proved via a translation into the MOBIUS logic, 
and every well-typed program is verifiable [21, Thm. 3.1.1]. Using the technique of 
type-preserving compilation we can lift this above the JVM: we match the translation 
from a high-level program F  to bytecode [F J with a corresponding translation of types; 
and again for every well-typed program its bytecode compilation is verifiable in the 
MOBIUS logic [21, Thm. 3.1.3]. Even without the original high-level source program 
and its types, this low-level proof can certify the bytecode for PCC.
Work in the MRG project [4] demonstrated more sophisticated space inference for 
a functional language, using Hofmann-Jost typing [30] to give space bounds dependent 
on argument size, and with these types used to generate resource proofs in a precursor 
of the MOBIUS logic. We have now developed this further, into a space type system for 
object oriented programming based on amortised complexity analysis [31].
Billable events Existing MIDP security policies demand that users individually au­
thorise text messages as they are sent. This is clearly awkward, and the series of con­
firmation pop-up screens is a soft target for social engineering attacks. We propose a 
Java library of resource managers that add flexibility without compromising safety[21, 
§3.3]: instead of individual confirmation, a program requests authorisation in advance 
for a series of activities. Resource security may be assured either by runtime checks, 
or a type system for resource accounting, such that any well-typed program will only 
attempt to use resources for which it already has authorisation.
We have also used abstract interpretation to model such external resources [10]. 
From a program control-flow graph, we infer constraints in a lattice of permissions: 
whenever some resourceful action takes place, the program must have acquired at least 
the permissions required. Automated constraint solving can then determine whether this 
condition is satisfiable.
Execution time Static analysis to count instructions executed can be verified in bytecode 
logic using resource algebras [3]. We have recently developed a static analysis frame­
work [?] which provides a basis for performing cost analysis directly at the bytecode
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level. This allows obtaining cost relations in terms of the size of input arguments to 
methods. In addition, platform-dependent factors are a significant challenge to predict­
ing real execution time across varied mobile platforms. We have shown how param- 
eterised cost models, calibrated to an individual platform by running a test program, 
can predict execution times on different architectures [33]. In a PCC framework, client 
devices would map certified platform-independent cost metrics into platform-dependent 
estimates, based on fixed calibration benchmarks.
Alias control Alias characterisations simplify reasoning about programs [26]: they 
enable modular verification, facilitate thread synchronisation, and allow programmers 
to exchange internal representations of data structures. Ownership types [18,17] and 
Universe types [35] are mechanisms for characterising aliasing in object oriented 
programming languages. They organise the heap into a hierarchical structure of nested 
non-overlapping contexts where every object is contained in one such context. Each 
context is characterised by an object, which is said to own all the objects contained 
directly in that context. Figure 3 illustrates the ownership structure of a linked list with 
iterator.
Fig. 3. Object structure of a linked list. The LinkedList object owns the nodes of the doubly- 
linked list. The iterator is in the same context as the list head. It has a peer reference to the list 
head and an any reference to the Node object at the iterator position.
In the Universe Type System [35,26], a context hierarchy is induced by extending 
types with Universe annotations, which range over rep , peer, and any. A field typed 
with a Universe modifier rep  denotes that the object referenced by it must be within the 
context of the current object; a field typed with a Universe modifier peer denotes that the 
object referenced by it must be within the context that also contains the current object; 
a field typed with a Universe modifier any is agnostic about the context containing the 
object referenced by the field.
So far, we have concentrated on the following three areas:
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-  Universe Java: The formalisation and proof of soundness of a minimal object- 
oriented language with Universe Types.
-  Generic Universe Java: The extension of Universe Java to Generic Java.
-  Concurrent Universe Java: The use of Universe Types to administer race conditions 
and atomicity in a concurrent version of Universe Java.
UJ - Universe Java As a basis for the other two work areas, we formalized Universe 
Java and proved the following key properties:
-  Type safety: The Universe annotations rep  and peer correctly indicate the owner 
of an object.
-  Encapsulation: The fields of an object can only be modified through method calls 
made on the owner of that object (owner-as-modifier discipline).
GUJ - Generic Universe Java We extended Universe Java to handle generics, which 
now form part of the official release of Java 1.5. In Generic Java, classes have parameters 
which can be bound by types: since in Universe Java, types are made up of a Universe 
modifier and a class, GUJ class parameters in generic class definitions are bound by 
Universe modifiers and classes. Generic Universe Java provide more static type safety 
then Universe Java by reducing the need for downcasts with runtime ownership checks. 
We proved that GUJ is type safe and enforces encapsulation.
UJ and Concurrency The Universe ownership relation in UJ provides a natural way to 
characterise non-overlapping nested groups of objects in a heap. We therefore exploit 
this structure in a Java with multiple concurrent threads [25] to ensure atomcity and 
absence of data races.
6 Towards certificate generation and certificate checking
An important part of a PCC infrastructure is concerned with certificates. For the code 
producer one of the main tasks is to generate a certificate ensuring that his program 
meets the security policy of the client. In contrast, the code verifier/consumer needs to 
convince himself that the transmitted program respects his security policy.
In the scenario of Fig. 2 we assume that operators send compiled code, i.e. bytecode, 
to their customers, but this leaves the question of whether code producers will supply 
source code or bytecode to the operator. In MOBIUS, we concentrate on the latter, since 
this avoids the inclusion of the compiler in the trusted code base and does not require 
code producers to provide access to their source code.
6.1 Certificate generation
The MOBIUS project focuses on two approaches for the generation of certificates, logic- 
based verification and type-based verification. By exploring both approaches, we hope 
to complement the rigorousness of our formalization by flexibility and automation.
The first technique (logic-based verification) is the concept of a proof transforming 
compiler [6], where properties can be specified and verified at the source code level and
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are then guaranteed to be preserved by the compilation, analogously to the way that 
type-preserving compilation guarantees the preservation of properties in the context of 
type systems. In addition to a program written in the source language, such a compiler 
expects a proof that the source program satisfies a (high-level) specification. Its output 
consist of the bytecode program and a proof (certifícate) that this program satisfies 
the translation of the original specification into a formalism appropriate for bytecode. 
Logic-based verification is particularly suitable for functional correctness properties, but 
we have already shown in previous work how to generate JML annotations for a large 
class of high-level security properties [39]. Interactive usage of the proof assistant, for 
example in order to discharge side conditions emitted by the VCgen, is also admissible. 
To be able to write such a proof transforming compiler for Java programs annotated 
with JML, we have developed a dedicated annotation language for Java bytecode: the 
Bytecode Modeling Language (BML) [13].
The second technique for the generation of specifications and certificates, type-based 
verification, rests on automated (and in general conservatively approximate) program 
analysis. Here, certificates are derived from typing derivations or fixed-point solutions 
of abstract interpretations, as outlined in the previous section and in the philosophy of 
lightweight bytecode verification.
6.2 Certificate checking
For the code verifier/consumer, the goal is to check that the received program meets its 
specification (i.e. check the validity of the certificate) and to ensure that the specification 
is compliant with his security policies. Both parts should be fully automatic, and the 
machinery employed for this task is part of the trusting computing base (TCB).
The size of TCB is one of the main difficulties in a PCC architecture. Foundational 
PCC [2] minimizes the TCB by modeling the operational semantics of the bytecode in a 
proof assistant, and by proving properties of programs w.r.t. the operational semantics. 
Then deductive reasoning is used to encode program logic rules or typing rules. FPCC 
allows to remove the VCgen and type checkers for the application type systems from the 
TCB, but the deductive reasoning to encode proof rules or typing rules leads to bigger 
certificates than using a VCgen or a type checker.
One ambitious goal is to merge both approaches, and to get a small TCB and small 
certificates. Ultimately, a MOBIUS certificate is always a Coq proof of desired property 
phrased in terms of semantics. Apart from the proof assistant itself, Bicolano represents 
the trusting computing base of MOBIUS reasoning infrastructure. By representing 
formal systems in a proof assistant, we firstly increase the confidence in the validity 
of our checkers. Secondly, these representations allow us to exploit the infrastructure of 
the proof assistant when verifying concrete programs and their certificates.
Based on this, and complementing FPCC, the following two proof methodologies 
for type-based verification are considered within MOBIUS.
Derived Assertions The Derived Assertions-Approach pioneered in MRG associates 
with each typing judgement an assertion in the program logic, the derived assertion. 
For each (schematic) typing rule one then proves a derived program logic proof rule
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operating on these derived assertions and possibly involving semantic, e.g. arithmetic, 
side conditions to be discharged by the proof assistant. Given a concrete typing 
derivation, a proof of the derived assertion corresponding to its conclusion can then 
be obtained by a simple tactic which invokes these derived rules mirroring the typing 
derivation. The typing derivation itself will typically be obtained using an automatic 
type inference which then need not be part of the TCB.
Reflection Recent versions of Coq come with a powerful computational engine [27] 
derived from the OCAML compiler. This allows computationally intensive tasks to be 
carried out within the proof assistant itself. A prominent example thereof is Gonthier- 
Werner’s self-contained proof of the four-color theorem within Coq. This feature can be 
harnessed for our purposes in the following way using the reflection mechanism:
-  we encode a type system T as a boolean-valued function typableT on programs, 
and prove that the type system is sound in the sense that it enforces some expected 
semantic property interpT. Formally, soundness is established by proving the 
lemma
TypeCorrect : VP : prog. typableT (P ) =  true = ^  interpT(P )
-  to prove that interpT(P0) holds for a particular program P 0, we just have to apply 
the TypeCorrect lemma, and prove that typableT (P0) =  true holds.
-  if your checker allows you to reason by computation (i.e. two propositions are equal 
if they are computationally equal) and if the program P 0 is typable, the proposition
typableT (P0) =  true
is equal (i.e. reduces) to true =  true which is trivial to prove.
The Coq proof assistant allows such a reasoning mechanism. In Coq, the representation 
of such a proof is TypeCorrect P  (refLequal true), where (refLequal true) is a proof of 
true =  true.
Similar to this reflectional approach to PCC is the technique we presented in [14], 
where lattice abstract interpretation is used to verify bounded memory use. Significantly, 
here both the algorithm and its correctness proof are expressed within the Coq proof 
assistant, such that we may extract a certified checker from the proof itself. This allows a 
novel realisation of proof-carrying code, where a fast program verifier is trusted because 
it is obtained from its own proof of correctness.
7 Next steps
After a year activity, the MOBIUS project is well on tracks. Scientific progress is pro­
ceeding as expected: security requirements and the PCC scenarios for global computing 
have been defined, and significant advances in enabling technologies have been re­
ported in deliverables and scientific publications. For further information, please consult 
http://mobius.inria.fr.
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